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Abstract—Road congestion induces significant costs across the
world, and road network disturbances, such as traffic accidents,
can cause highly congested traffic patterns. If a planner had
control over the routing of all vehicles in the network, they could
easily reverse this effect. In a more realistic scenario, we consider
a planner that controls autonomous cars, which are a fraction
of all present cars. We study a dynamic routing game, in which
the route choices of autonomous cars can be controlled and the
human drivers react selfishly and dynamically to autonomous
cars’ actions. As the problem is prohibitively large, we use
deep reinforcement learning to learn a policy for controlling the
autonomous vehicles. This policy influences human drivers to
route themselves in such a way that minimizes congestion on
the network. To gauge the effectiveness of our learned policies,
we establish theoretical results characterizing equilibria on a
network of parallel roads and empirically compare the learned
policy results with best possible equilibria. Moreover, we show
that in the absence of these policies, high demands and network
perturbations would result in large congestion, whereas using
the policy greatly decreases the travel times by minimizing the
congestion. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that employs deep reinforcement learning to reduce congestion by
influencing humans’ routing decisions in mixed-autonomy traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONGESTION can result in substantial economic andsocial costs [1] which have only been growing in recent
years, especially with the advent of ride-hailing services [2].
Congestion is formed by a number of mechanisms, such as
when many vehicles try to enter a road at the same time. A
higher-level cause is from how people choose their routes
– when people selfishly choose the quickest routes available
to them, this often results in greater congestion and longer
travel time than if people had their routes chosen for them
optimally in terms of the overall experienced delay [3]. There
are some existing methods for fighting congestion, such as
congestion pricing [4], variable speed limits [5] and highway
ramp metering [6]. However, they can be difficult to administer,
and can require significant changes to infrastructure.
The introduction of autonomous vehicles to public roads
provides an opportunity for better congestion management. Our
key idea is that by controlling the routing of autonomous vehi-
cles, we can change the delay associated with traversing each
road, thereby indirectly influencing peoples’ routing choices.
By influencing people to use more “socially advantageous”
routes, we can eliminate long queues and significantly reduce
traffic jams on roads.
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The model for mixed-autonomy traffic, meaning traffic with
both human-driven and autonomous vehicles, is complex,
involving very large and continuous state space and continuous
action space. Having human drivers dynamically respond to
the choices of the autonomous vehicles further complicates
the matter, making a dynamic programming-based approach
and other classical methods infeasible. Because of this, we use
deep reinforcement learning (RL) to learn a policy. Specifically,
we show it is possible to learn a policy via proximal policy
optimization (PPO) [7] that mitigates traffic congestion by
managing routing of autonomous cars given the network state.
To understand the performance of the learned policy, we
investigate the equilibrium behavior of the network. Previous
works [8], [9] have shown that there is a wide spectrum of
equilibria in traffic networks, meaning situations in which
everyone is taking the quickest route immediately available to
them, and these equilibria can have greatly varying average
user delay. We establish efficient ways to compute equilibria
in the network and compare the best equilibrium (in terms
of latency) with the RL policy, which works regardless of
whether equilibrium conditions hold or not. We show that the
learned policy reaches the ‘desirable’ equilibria that have low
travel times when starting with varying traffic patterns, and
can recover network functionality after a disturbance such as
a traffic accident.
Our contributions are as follows:
• Vehicle flow and choice modeling: We formalize a traffic
model that extends the classic Cell Transmission Model
(CTM) [10] to characterize vehicle flow on parallel shared
roads. We adopt log-linear learning to model how people
update their routing choices as traffic states change.
• Finding a control policy via deep RL: We employ deep RL
methods to learn a routing policy for autonomous cars that
effectively saves the traffic network from unboundedly large
delays.
• Theoretical analysis: We characterize equilibria in the
network and derive a polynomial-time computation for
finding optimal equilibria. We show that the RL control
policy is able to bring our network state to the best possible
equilibrium when starting from a congested equilibrium or
after a network disturbance.
We visualize our framework as a schematic diagram in
Fig. 1 and preview our results in Fig. 2, showing that the RL
policy successfully stabilizes queues in the traffic which would
otherwise be congested.
Literature review. Many works seek to understand how
much traffic network latency could be improved if vehicle
routing was controlled by a central planner, including works
on congestion games [3], [11]–[14]. Some study how indirectly
influencing peoples’ routing choices by providing them network
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Fig. 1: The schematic diagram of our framework. Our deep RL agent processes the state of the traffic and outputs a control policy for
autonomous cars’ routing.
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Fig. 2: (a) The traffic queue grows linearly when all vehicles try to
minimize their travel time, whereas (b) RL control of autonomous
cars stabilizes this queue (note the scales).
state information affects network performance [15], [16].
Stackelberg Routing, in which only some of the vehicles are
controlled, is another way to influence routing [17], [18]; some
works incorporate the dynamics of human routing choices [19].
While providing useful techniques for analysis, the congestion
game framework does not reflect a fundamental empirical
understanding about vehicle flow on roads, namely that roads
with low vehicle density have a roughly constant latency, and
roads with high density see latency increase as flow decreases.
Works on CTM [10], [20] capture this phenomenon, in-
cluding works that characterize equilibria on roads described
with CTM [6]. Notably, some consider equilibria, but not
dynamics, of parallel-road Stackelberg Games, including with
mixed autonomy [8], [9].
Some works look at the low-level control of autonomous
vehicles, specifically how to control their acceleration to smooth
traffic flow and ease congestion at bottlenecks [21], [22]; [23]
provides a benchmark for gauging the performance of these
techniques. Other works learn ramp metering policies [23] and
model lane-change behavior with a neural net [24].
II. VEHICLE FLOW DYNAMICS: MODELING ROADS
In this section we describe dynamics governing how vehicle
flow travels on a road. We extend the CTM, a widely used
model that discretizes roads into cells, each with uniform
density [10], [20], for mixed-autonomy traffic. In CTM, each
road segment has a maximum flow that can traverse it. The
key idea of our extension is that since autonomous vehicles
can keep a shorter headway (distance to the car in front of
it), the greater the fraction of autonomous vehicles on a road,
the greater the maximum flow that the road can serve [9].
Accordingly, our extension of CTM lies in the dependence
of cell parameters on the autonomy level, or the fraction of
autonomous vehicles, in each cell.
Consider a road, or path, p, composed of Ip cells. Each cell i
has the following parameters: free-flow velocity v¯p,i, headway
for human driven cars (resp. autonomous cars) traveling at the
free-flow velocity hhp,i (resp. h
a
p,i) with units cells/vehicle, and
number of lanes bp,i.
Each cell also has a vehicle density, or number of vehicles on
it, np,i = nhp,i +n
a
p,i, where n
h
p,i and n
a
p,i are, respectively, the
number of human-driven and autonomous vehicles. As the cells
are much larger compared to the vehicles, we consider these
quantities to be continuous variables. Let αp,i = nap,i/(n
h
p,i +
nap,i) ∈ [0, 1] denote the autonomy level, or the fraction of
autonomous vehicles.
In the CTM, there are two regimes for vehicle flow: free-
flow, in which the cell density is less than some critical density,
and the congested regime, in which the cell density is greater
than the critical density but less than the jam density. The
jam density is the density at which traffic completely stops,
denoted the n¯p,i. As in [9], [14], [25], [26] and represented
in Fig. 3 (a), we model1 the critical density as n˜p,i(αp,i) :=
bp,i/(αp,ih
a
p + (1− αp,i)hhp).
There are three factors that can limit the flow from one cell
to another. One is the capacity, or maximum flow out of a
cell, which is the flow of vehicles that traverse the cell at the
critical density:
F¯p,i(αp,i) := v¯p,in˜p,i(αp,i) . (1)
The flow out of a cell is also limited by the demand in the cell,
v¯p,inp,i. The flow entering a cell is limited by that cell’s supply,
(n¯p,i − np,i)wp,i(αp,i), where wp,i, the shockwave speed, is
wp,i(αp,i) := v¯p,in˜p,i(αp,i)/(n¯p,i − n˜p,i(αp,i)) .
Combining these, we denote the flow from cell i−1 to cell
i on path p as fp,i−1. As shown in Fig. 3 (b),
fp,i−1 :=
min
(
v¯p,i−1np,i−1,(n¯p,i−np,i)wp,i(αp,i),F¯p,i−1(αp,i−1)
)
. (2)
1In this model, autonomous vehicles can follow any vehicle with headway
hap, regardless of the type of vehicle it is following, or autonomous vehicles
can rearrange themselves to form platoons as in [27].
Fig. 3: (a) Fundamental diagram of traffic governing vehicle flow in each cell of the Cell Transmission Model. The solid line corresponds to
a road with only human-driven vehicles; the dashed line represents a road with both vehicle types at autonomy level αi. Green and red
respectively represent a road in free-flow and congestion. (b) The flow from one cell to another is a function of the density n and autonomy
level α in each cell. In both figures, we suppress the notation for path p.
We consider no capacity limit for vehicles entering a road
and no supply limit for vehicles exiting a road. We use fp,0
to denote the flow entering path p and require that fp,0 ≤
(n¯p,1 − np,1)wp,1(αp,1). Similarly, the flow exiting a road is
fp,Ip := min(v¯pnp,Ip , F¯p,Ip(αp,Ip)).
Putting this together, we describe the dynamical system
(transition model of density of each cell on each path) as
follows, where k denotes the time index.
nhp,i(k + 1) =
nhp,i(k)+(1−αp,i−1(k))fp,i−1(k)− (1− αp,i(k))fp,i(k)
nap,i(k + 1) = n
a
p,i(k)+αp,i−1(k)fp,i−1(k)−αp,i(k)fp,i(k)
np,i(k + 1) = np,i(k) + fp,i−1(k)− fp,i(k) . (3)
Accidents. In order to evaluate the performance of the
developed RL policy in reacting to disturbances, we consider
stochastic accidents occuring in the network. We model traffic
accidents as stochastic events, each of which causes one lane
to be closed. We let accidents occur in any cell at any time
with equal probability. Each accident is cleared out after
some number of time steps, which is drawn from a Poisson
distribution. If b¯p,i lanes of cell i of path p are closed due to
accidents, then the jam density and the critical density for the
cell reduce to (bp,i − b¯p,i)/bp,i of their original values. Hence,
accidents introduce time-dependency to critical density and
jam density variables.
III. NETWORK DYNAMICS: ROUTING FOR HUMANS AND
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
We consider a network of P parallel paths and use [P ]
to denote the set of paths. We use λh and λa to denote the
human-driven and autonomous vehicle demands, respectively.
As the number of vehicles entering a road is limited by the
supply of the first cells, we model cars desiring to enter the
network as forming a queue q that consists of packets each
holding qj cars. We provide a mathematical description of how
this queue disburses cars into the network in the Appendix
(Section VII-B).
A. Human choice dynamics
In general, people wish to minimize the amount of time
spent traveling. However, people don’t change routing choices
instantaneously in response to new information; rather they have
some inertia and only change strategies sporadically. Moreover,
we assume people only account for current conditions and
do not strategize based on predictions of the future [28].
Accordingly, we use an evolutionary dynamic to describe how a
population of users choose their routes. Specifically, we model
the human driver population as following Hedge Dynamics,
also called Log-linear Learning [29]–[31].
Let µh ∈ RP≥0 be the routing vector for the human-driven
flow, where µhp represents the fraction of human-driven vehicles
that choose to travel on path p; accordingly,
∑
p∈[P ] µ
h
p = 1.
Let `p(k) denote how long it would take to traverse path p if
a user starts at time k; our model assumes that users have an
accurate assessment of this delay, which is plausible given the
widespread use of navigation services such as Google Maps
or Waze. The routing vector is updated as follows.
µhp(k + 1) =
µhp(k) exp(−ηh(k)`p(k))∑
p′∈[P ] µ
h
p′(k) exp(−ηh(k)`p′(k))
. (4)
The ratio of the volume of vehicles using a road at successive
time steps is inversely proportional to the exponential of the
delay experienced by users of that road. The learning rate ηh(k)
may be decreasing or constant. Krichene et al. introduce this
model in the context of humans’ routing choices and simulate
a congestion game with Amazon Mechanical Turk users to
show the model accurately predicts human behavior [32].
B. Autonomous vehicle control policy
We assume that we have control over the routing of
autonomous vehicles. We justify this by assuming that a city
can coordinate with the owner of an autonomous fleet to
decrease congestion in the city. Moreover, unlike traditional
tolling, coordination between autonomous vehicles and city
infrastructure makes it possible to have fast-changing and
geographically finely quantized tolls, allowing routing control to
be achieved through incentives [33]. The routing of autonomous
vehicles is then our control parameter by which we influence
the state of traffic on the network. We denote the autonomous
routing vector µa ∈ RP≥0, where
∑
p∈[P ] µ
a
p = 1.
We assume the existence of a central controller, or social
planner, which dictates µa by processing the state of the
network. At each time step, we let the controller observe:
• the number of human-driven and autonomous vehicles in
each cell,
• the total number of human-driven and autonomous vehicles
waiting in the queue, and
• binary states for each lane that indicates whether the lane
is closed due to an accident or not.
We use deep RL to arrive at a policy for the social planner
to control the autonomous vehicle routing, µa. Since the
state space is very large and both state and action spaces
are continuous, a dynamic programming-based approach is
infeasible. For instance, even if we discretized the spaces, say
with 10 quantization levels, and did not have accidents, we
would have 1082 possible states, and 10 actions for a moderate-
size network with 40 cells in total.
We wish to minimize the total latency experienced by users,
which is equal to summing over time the number of users in
the system at each time step. Accordingly, we consider the
following stage cost:
J(k) =
∑
j
qj(k) +
∑
p∈[P ]
∑
i∈[Ip]
np,i(k) (5)
Due to their high performance in continuous control tasks
[7], [34], we employ policy gradient methods to come up with a
policy that produces µa given the observations. Specifically, we
use state-of-the-art PPO with an objective function augmented
by adding an entropy bonus for sufficient exploration [7],
[35]. We build a deep neural network, and train it using Adam
optimizer [36]. The set of parameters we use is in the Appendix
(Section VII-E). We set each episode to have a fixed number
of time steps.
In order to evaluate the performance of our control policy,
we use three criteria. The first is the throughput of the network
– we wish to have a policy that can serve any feasible demand,
thereby stabilizing the queue. The second is the average delay
experienced by users of the network, which we measure by
counting the number of vehicles in the system. The third is
the convergence to some steady state; we wish to avoid wild
oscillations in congestion. To contextualize the performance
of our control policy in this framework, we first establish the
performance of equilibria of the network.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we examine the possible equilibria of our
dynamical system, which characterize the possible steady state
behaviors of the system. A network with a given demand can
have a variety of equilibria with varying average user delay.
If our control achieves overall delay equal to that of the best
possible equilibrium, it is a successful policy. Section V shows
that our learned policy can achieve the best equilibrium in a
variety of settings.
We are interested in network equilibria, which require both
equilibrium on each path as well as equilibrium with respect
to the human choice dynamics. Equilibria are parameterized
by vehicle flow demand. Hence, we assume for theoretical
analysis that the flow demands are constant and there are no
accidents. In this section we provide sketches of proofs for the
theoretical results and defer the full proofs, including proofs of
the lemmas, to the appendix. We first analyze path equilibria.
A. Path equilibrium
To ease our analysis, we begin by restricting the considered
class of roads to those with a single bottleneck, meaning one
point on the road at which cell capacity drops. Formally, we
consider each path p to have mnp cells, each with b
n
p lanes,
followed by mbp cells downstream, each with b
b
p lanes, where
bbp < b
n
p. We define rp := b
b
p/b
n
p ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 1. All cells in a path have the same model
parameters, except for a decrease in the number of cell lanes
after the mnp upstream-most cells.
We use v¯p to denote the free-flow velocity of path p. Using
Assumption 1, we present a theoretical result that completely
analytically characterizes the road latencies that can occur at
equilibrium.
Theorem 1. At equilibrium, a road p with flow dynamics
described by (3) will have the same autonomy level in all
cells. Denote this autonomy level αp. Under Assumption 1,
if the vehicle flow demand is strictly less than the minimum
cell capacity, the road will have no congested cells. Otherwise,
the road will have any of the following latencies, where γp ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . ,mnp}:
`p =
Ip
v¯p
+ γp
(1− rp)n¯np(αphap + (1− αp)hhp)
rpv¯pbnp
.
Proof. The proof is composed of three lemmas. We first
establish a property of road equilibria that allows us to treat
the vehicle flow as if it were composed of a single car type.
With this, we use the CTM model to characterize possible
equilibria on a road. We then derive the delay associated with
each congested cell. Combining the latter two lemmas yields
the theorem. We begin with a lemma based on the definition
of equilibrium, in which there is constant incoming flow of
each car type.
Lemma 1. A path in equilibrium with nonzero incoming flow
has the same autonomy level in all cells of the road, which is
equal to the autonomy level of the vehicle flow onto the road.
Formally, a path p with demand (λ¯hp, λ¯
a
p) in equilibrium has
αp,1 = αp,2 = . . . = αp,Ip = λ¯
a
p/(λ¯
h
p + λ¯
a
p) .
With this result, our analysis of road equilibria simplifies to
that of single-typed traffic, with the autonomy level treated as
a parameter. The next lemma, similarly to Theorem 4.1 of [6],
completely characterize the congestion patterns that can occur
in road equilibria.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, if the demand on a road
is less than the minimum capacity of its cells, they will be
uncongested at equilibrium. Otherwise, a road with demand
equal to the minimum cell capacity will have mnp equilibria.
The set of equilibria has the following congested cells:{∅, {mnp}, {mnp − 1,mnp}, . . . , {1, . . . ,mnp − 2,mnp − 1,mnp}} .
We use these properties to find a closed-form expression
for the latency incurred by traveling through a bottleneck cell,
which when combined with Lemma 2, completes the proof.
Lemma 3. The latency incurred by traveling through a
congested cell is as follows.
1
v¯p
+
(1− rp)n¯np(αphap + (1− αp)hhp)
rpv¯pbnp
.
The two terms above are the free-flow delay and the per-
cell latency due to congestion, respective. Theorem 1 allows
us to calculate the possible latencies of a road as a function
of its autonomy level αp. Since in a network equilibrium all
used roads have the same latency, we can calculate network
equilibria more efficiently than comprehensively searching over
all possible routings. However, the discretization of roads into
cell poses a problem – if cells are too big a network equilibrium
may not even exist! To avoid this artifact from modeling with
CTM, when analyzing network equilibria we consider the cells
to be small enough that we can consider the continuous variable
γp ∈ [0,mnp].
B. Network equilibrium
We define the best equilibrium to be the equilibrium that
serves a given flow demand with minimum latency. We are
now ready to establish properties of network equilibria, as well
as how to compute the best equilibria. We use the following
two assumptions in our analysis of network equilibrium.
Assumption 2. No two paths have the same free-flow latency.
Assumption 3. The initial choice distribution has positive
human-driven and autonomous vehicle flow on each road.
We use the convention of ordering the roads in the order of
increasing free-flow latency.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a routing that
minimizes total latency when all users (both human drivers and
autonomous users) are selfish can be computed in O(P 3 logP )
time. A routing that minimizes total latency when human drivers
are selfish and autonomous users are controlled can also be
computed in O(P 3 logP ) time.
Proof. We first establish properties of network equilibria.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2, if some users are selfish and
some users are not selfish, then the best equilibrium will have
the following properties:
1) the road with largest free-flow latency used by selfish users
will be in free-flow,
2) all roads with lower free-flow latency will be congested,
3) roads with greater free-flow latency may have nonselfish
users, and
4) roads used with larger free-flow latency that have nonselfish
users on them will be at capacity, except perhaps the road
with largest free-flow latency that is used by nonselfish
users.
Using these theoretical results, optimal equilibria can be
calculated efficiently using the linear programs described in
the Appendix.
Using these properties to compute optimal equilibria as in
the Appendix (Section VII-D), we establish a framework for
understanding the performance of our learned control policy. If
the policy can reach the best equilibrium latency starting from
arbitrary road conditions we view the policy as successful. We
use this baseline to evaluate our experimental results in the
following section.
A question then arises: if we have computed the best possible
equilibria, why don’t we directly implement that control? This
approach is not fruitful, since the network can start in any state,
including worse equilibria, from which good equilibria won’t
emerge when autonomous vehicles unilaterally use their routing
in the best equilibrium. A dynamic policy which depends on
the current traffic state is therefore needed to guide the network
to the best equilibrium. As shown in the following, the learned
policy reaches the best equilibrium in a variety of settings.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In all of the experiments2, we adopt the following parameters.
All vehicles are 4 meters long. Human drivers keep a 2 second
headway distance, whereas autonomous cars can keep 1 second.
Each time step corresponds to 1 minute of real-life simulation.
Each episode during deep RL training covers 5 hours of real-life
simulation (300 time steps). In test time, we simulate 6 hours
of real-life (360 time steps). We divide roads into the cells
such that it takes 1 time step to traverse each cell in free-flow.
We initialize np,i ∼ unif(0, n˜p,i) for ∀i ∈ [Ip], p ∈ [P ].
Our overall control scheme can be seen in Fig. 1(a). As the
learning model, we build a two-hidden-layer neural network,
with each layer having 256 nodes. We train an RL agent for
each configuration that we will describe later on. All trainings
simulate 40 million time steps3.
We compare our method with a baseline where all cars
are selfish and use the human choice dynamics presented in
Sec. III-A. In all experiments, we set ηh(k) (and ηa(k) for the
baseline) to be 0.5 ∀k.
We consider a network from downtown Los Angeles to the
San Fernando Valley with 3 roads. The highway numbers and
the approximated parameter tuples (length, number of lanes,
speed limit) are:
1) 110N (5 miles, 3 lanes, 60 mph); 101N (10 miles, 3 lanes
for 5 miles then 2 lanes, 60 mph)
2) 10E (5 miles, 4 lanes, 75 mph); 5N (10 miles, 4 lanes, 75
mph); 134W (5 miles, 3 lanes, 75 mph)
3) 10W; 405N (both 10 miles, 4 lanes, 75 mph); 101S (5 miles,
3 lanes, 75 mph)
We perform three sets of experiments. In the first two, we
disable accidents and set demand variance 0, i.e. λa = λ¯a,
λh = λ¯h to have no perturbations after initialization.
Varying number of roads. In the first set, we vary the
number of routes P ∈ {2, 3, 4} by duplicating, or removing,
the third route. We set the autonomy level of the demand
α¯ = 0.6, and λ¯h + λ¯a to be 95% of the maximum capacity
under this autonomy level. We plot learning curves in Fig. 4 (a).
It can be seen that even with P =4 when observation space
is 144-dimensional (as the accidents were disabled), the agent
successfully learns routing within 40 million time steps. With
randomized initial states, the agents learn routing policies that
2We make the code available in the supplementary material.
3Other hyperparameter values we use for PPO are in the Appendix.
achieve nearly as good as optimal equilibrium when P ∈{2, 3}.
While the agent for P =4 also decreases the average cost, it
requires either a little more training, or better hyperparameter
tuning. In Fig. 4 (b), we plot the number of cars (mean ±
standard error over 100 simulations) in the system as a function
of time steps. While selfish routing causes congestion by
creating linearly growing queues when P > 2, RL policies
successfully stabilize queues and even reach car numbers of
optimal equilibria when P < 4. From the learning curve for
P =4, it can be deduced we can also achieve car numbers of
optimal equilibria with more careful training.
Varying autonomy. We take P =3 and vary the autonomy
of demand α¯ ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7} without changing the total
demand λ¯h + λ¯a. Note the demands are infeasible when α¯ ∈
{0.4, 0.5}. In Fig. 5 (a), we plot the number of cars (mean ±
standard error over 100 simulations) in the system as a function
of time steps. The result is similar to the previous experiment
when the demand is feasible. With infeasible demand, RL
agent keeps a queue that is only marginally longer than the
queue that would be created by optimal equilibrium. On the
other hand, selfish routing grows the queue with much faster
rates. These experiments show RL policy successfully handles
random initializations.
Perturbations. In the third set, we fix P = 3 and α¯ = 0.6
for the same total average demand. We evaluate what happens
when we enable accidents and noise in the demand. We assume
the standard deviations of the demand noise are λ¯h/10 and
λ¯a/10 for human-driven and autonomous vehicles, respectively.
We set the probability of accidents such that the expected
frequency of accidents is 1 per 100 minutes, and clearing out
an accident takes 30 minutes on average [37]. As it can be
seen from Fig. 5 (b), the RL agent successfully handles the
perturbations due to accidents and noisy demands. This plot
also shows how accidents perturb the system. To give a clearer
picture, we provide detailed information about the system states
in Fig. 6, which shows the number of cars in each cell as well
as the queue lengths over time. The small oscillations, which
occur even after the effect of the accidents disappear (after fifth
hour), are due to noisy demand and the discretization of cells.
With selfish routing, the vehicles tend to not use the longest
road. They use it only when there is an accident in another
road (around first hour) or the other two roads are congested
(around fourth hour). In contrast, RL makes good use of the
network and leads to altruistic behavior. It also handles the
accidents by effectively altering the routing of autonomous cars
(around fourth hour, autonomous cars start using the first route
until the accident is cleared). Hence, it manages to stabilize the
queue and prevent congestion. We provide video visualizations
of this run in the supplementary material.
VI. CONCLUSION
Summary. In this work we presented a framework for
understanding a dynamic traffic network shared between selfish
human drivers and controllable autonomous vehicles. We show,
using reinforcement learning, we can find a policy to minimize
the average travel time experienced by users of the network.
We develop theoretical results to describe and calculate the
best equilibria that can exist and show that our policy reaches
the best possible equilibrium performance. Further, we provide
case studies showing how the training period scales with the
number of roads, and we show that our control policy is robust
to accidents and stochastic demand.
Limitations. We used the number of cars in each cell as
predictive features for RL training. Although this makes the
state space dimensionality grow only linearly with the number
of cells, it may not be scalable to much larger traffic networks.
Future work. This work opens up many future directions
for research, including improving how the training time scales
with the number of roads and extending this to more complex
network topologies.
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Fig. 4: Varying number of roads. (a) Average number of cars in the system per episode during RL training. (b) Time vs. number of cars in
the system for the comparison of selfish and RL routing.
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Fig. 5: (a) Varying autonomy. (b) Varying the presence of accidents and noise in the demand.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Summary of notation
See Table I.
B. Queue dynamics
We consider a queue of vehicles that are waiting to join
the network. In order to describe the dynamics of the queue
we borrow the “packet” terminology from communication
networks. We consider a packet of vehicles to be a tuple (qhj , q
a
j),
where qhj ∈ R≥0 is a volume of human-driven vehicles and
qaj ∈ R≥0 is a volume of autonomous vehicles. At each time
step a nonnegative random demand (λh(k), λa(k)) is added
as a packet to the end of the queue, and vehicles enter the
network starting from the front of the queue, starting with
the zeroth packet. This structure preserves the first-in-first-out
property for the network.
The factor limiting vehicles from entering the network
is the supply on each road, (n¯p,1 − np,1(k))wp,1(αp,1(k)).
We allocate as many packets, and fractions of packets, as
possible until the supply constraint is violated on one of the
roads. Formally, at each time step the queue is updated as in
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Fig. 6: The network under perturbations due to accidents and noisy demand. For each road and time step, from bottom to top, the stacked
color segments show the number of cars in the cells from origin to the destination. Congestion occurs only upstream to the bottlenecks. (a)
Selfish routing. (b) RL routing.
TABLE I: Summary of Notation
p Path, or road, index unitless
P # of paths in the network paths
[P ] Set of paths in the network set of paths
i Cell index unitless
(p, i) Cell i of path p unitless
Ip # of cells in path p cells
(qhj , q
a
j) # of vehicles in queue packet j tuple of vehicles
v¯p,i Free-flow velocity of (p, i) cells/time step
bp,i Number of lanes of (p, i) unitless
hhp,i (h
a
p,i) Nominal vehicle headway on (p,i) cells/vehicle
nhp,i (n
a
p,i) Density of vehicles on (p, i) vehicles/cell
np,i Total vehicle density on (p, i) vehicles/cell
fhp,i (f
a
p,i) Flow of vehicles from (p, i) vehicles/time step
fp,i Total flow from (p, i) to (p, i+ 1) vehicles/time step
αp,i Autonomy level of (p, i) unitless
n˜p,i(α) Critical density of (p, i), at aut. α vehicles/cell
n¯p,i Jam (maximum) density of (p, i) vehicles/cell
F¯p,i(α) Capacity of (p,i), at aut. α vehicles/time step
wp,i(α) Shockwave speed of (p,i), at aut. α cells/time step
k Time index unitless
`p(k) Latency of path p if starting at time k time steps
µh (µa) Routing vector unitless
J(k) Stage cost at time k vehicles
mbp (m
n
p) # of (non)bottleneck cells on path p cells
bb (bn) # of lanes in (non)bottleneck cells on p unitless
rp := bb/bn unitless
γp Number of congested cells on path p cells
Algorithm 1, where 0P denotes the P -dimensional zero vector.
C. Proofs for Section IV-A
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By definition, at equilibrium, the number of vehicles
in each cell i of road p, nap,i(k) and n
a
p,i(k) is constant for
all times k. Since by definition the incoming flow is also
Algorithm 1 Queue Dynamics
Append packet (λ¯h(k), λ¯a(k)) to the end of the queue
f h ← 0P , f a ← 0P
sp ← (n¯p,1 − np,1(k))wp,1(αp,1(k)) ∀p ∈ [P ]
while f hp + f ap < sp ∀p ∈ [P ] do
if f hp + f ap + µh(k)qh0 + µa(k)qa0 ≤ sp ∀p ∈ [P ] then
f hp ← f hp + qh0 ∀p ∈ [P ]
f ap ← f ap + qa0 ∀p ∈ [P ]
Update state of the queue
if queue empty then
break
end if
else
y∗ ← arg maxy∈[0,1] y
s.t. f hp + f
a
p + y(µ
h(k)qh0 + µ
a(k)qa0) ≤ sp,∀p ∈ [P ]
f hp ← f hp + y∗ qh0 ∀p ∈ [P ]
f ap ← f ap + y∗ qa0 ∀p ∈ [P ]
qh0 ← (1− y∗)qh0
qa0 ← (1− y∗)qa0
break
end if
end while
constant, by (2), a constant state implies constant flows. By
(3), a constant density also implies that the incoming and
outgoing flow in each cell are equal. This means that all cells
will have the same incoming flow as the first cell. Further,
we know that since the density of autonomous vehicles is
constant over time, incoming and outgoing autonomy levels
are equal, i.e. αp,i−1(k)fp,i−1(k) = αp,i(k)fp,i(k). Since we
also have fp,i−1(k) = fp,i(k), this implies that αp,i−1(k) =
αp,i(k). Therefore the autonomy level of all cells is the same.
Let us denote this uniform autonomy level αp. For the first
cell, λ¯hp + λ¯
a
p = fp,0 and λ¯
a
p = αpfp,0. Combining these two
expressions, we find αp = λ¯ap/(λ¯
h
p + λ¯
a
p).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As mentioned in Section IV-A, this lemma relates
closely to Theorem 4.1 of [6]. However, we cannot directly
apply that theorem due to differing assumptions; namely they
assume F¯i+1 = (n¯i − n˜i)wi ∀i. We therefore offer a similar
proof, tailored to our assumptions.
For ease of notation, we drop all path subscripts p as well as
the cell index for the free-flow velocity parameter v¯. In light
of Lemma 1, we also suppress the autonomy level arguments
to capacity F¯i and critical density n˜i. The flow equation then
becomes fi = min(v¯ni, (n¯i+1 − ni+1)wi+1, F¯i).
We begin by proving that if the vehicle flow demand is
strictly less than the minimum capacity, i.e. the bottleneck
capacity, then the only equilibrium has no congested cells.
As mentioned in Section II, in our model there is no supply
limit to the flow exiting a road, so fI = min(v¯nI , F¯I). Since
f0 = fI < F¯I , f0 = fI = v¯nI . The definition of capacity,
F¯i = v¯n˜i, then implies that nI < n˜I , meaning that cell I is
uncongested, so v¯nI < (n¯I − nI)wI .
This is the base case for a proof by induction. Consider cell i
that is uncongested (i.e. ni < n˜i). Since by assumption all cells
have flow strictly less than the cell’s capacity, fi = v¯ni < F¯i.
Then consider the flow entering cell i: fi−1 =min(v¯ni−1, (n¯i−
ni)wi, F¯i−1)=fi<F¯i<(n¯i−ni)wi.
The fact that F¯i ≤ F¯i−1 then implies that fi−1 = v¯ni−1, so
cell i− 1 is uncongested, proving the lemma’s first statement.
The second statement assumes that the flow on the path is
equal to the minimum capacity. The cells in the bottleneck
segment all have the same capacity, which we denote F¯ b;
this capacity is less than the capacity of the cells in the
nonbottleneck segment. This means that all bottleneck cells
will be operating at capacity (and therefore have vehicle density
equal to their critical density); flow on the road is therefore
equal to F¯ b.
We now turn to the nonbottleneck segment. We first note
that if a nonbottleneck cell is uncongested then the preceeding
cell must be uncongested as well, using the same reasoning as
that proving the first statement above. Next, consider the flow
out of the downstream-most cell of the nonbottleneck segment:
fmn = min(v¯nmn , (n¯mn+1−nmn+1)wmn+1, F¯mn) = F¯ b < F¯mn ,
so fmn = min(v¯nmn , (n¯mn+1 − nmn+1)wmn+1). Cell mn can
be uncongested, in which case the cell density is such that
v¯nmn = F¯
b, or the cell can be congested, in which case
the second term dominates. Then, if nonbottleneck cell i is
congested, the flow into it is fi−1 = min(v¯ni−1, (n¯i−ni)wi).
Again, to achieve this flow, cell i− 1 can be either congested
or uncongested. As shown above, if i− 1 is uncongested, then
all upstream cells must be uncongested as well, yielding the
second statement in the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Recall that we assume roads have a uniform free-flow
velocity across all cells in a road, where path p has free-flow
velocity v¯p. We defined [mnp] as the set of cells before the
bottleneck, which have bnp lanes. The remaining cells, with
indices in the set [Ip] \ [mnp], have bbp lanes. Further recall the
definition rp = bbp/b
n
p. Let F¯
n
p (αp) denote the capacity of the
cells before the bottleneck of path p with autonomy level αp
and let F¯ bp (αp) be the same for the bottleneck cell. Note that
F¯ bp (αp) = rF¯
n
p (αp). Similarly, let w
n
p(αp) and w
b
p(αp) denote
the shockwave speed for prebottleneck cells and bottleneck cell,
respectively, on path p with autonomy level αp, as with jam
densities n¯np and n¯
b
p and critical densities n˜
n
p(αp) and n˜
b
p(αp).
To help our analysis, we define the congestion profile.
Definition 1. A congestion profile of a road is a binary vector
that has the same length as the number of cells in the road,
where each entry corresponds to a cell. If a cell is congested,
the corresponding entry is 1, otherwise it is 0. Formally, sp ∈
{0, 1}Ip
Lemma 2 establishes all possible congestion profiles that
a road in equilibrium can experience. We now investigate
how much delay each congestion profile induces on the road,
parameterized by the autonomy level of the road. Let fp denote
the flow on path p at an equilibrium. By Lemma 2 and the
definitions of r and capacity (1),
fp = F¯
b
p = rpF¯
n
p (αp) = rpw
n
p(αp)(n¯
n
p − n˜np(αp)) . (6)
Let ncp(αp) denote the vehicle density in a congested cell on
path p, which we know must occur upstream of the bottleneck
(Lemma 2). Then, the flow entering a congested cell before
the bottleneck is fp = wnp(αp)(n¯
n
p − ncp(αp)). Equating this
with (6), we find ncp(αp) = (1− rp)n¯np + rpn˜np(αp).
To use this to find the latency incurred by traveling through
a congested cell, we divide the density by the flow, as follows.
ncp(αp)
fp
=
ncp(αp)
F¯ bp (αp)
=
(1− rp)n¯np + rpn˜np(αp)
rpv¯pn˜np(αp)
=
1
v¯p
+
(1− rp)n¯np(αphap + (1− αp)hhp)
rpv¯pbnp
.
D. Proofs for Section IV-B
We begin with a proposition which follows from the
definition of equilibrium and Assumption 3.
Proposition 1. In a network equilibrium, the following are
true.
1) All roads with selfish drivers have the same latency.
2) All roads without selfish drivers have equal or greater
latency.
We next present a lemma that will support our results.
Lemma 5. If the set of equilibria contains a routing with
positive flow only on roads [p], then there exists a routing in
the set of equilibria in which road p is in free-flow.
Proof. Under Assumption 2, no two roads have the same
free-flow latency. With Proposition 1, this implies that if an
equilibrium has a used road with no congestion, it must be
the used road with greatest free-flow latency, as otherwise all
used roads would not have the same latency. Therefore, if an
equilibrium routing with positive flow on roads [p] has a road
in free-flow, it must be road p. Otherwise, we can construct an
equilibrium with the same demand that has road p in free-flow.
Recall that the latency on roads in equilibrium is increasing with
the length of the congested portion of the road, γp′ , and γp′ = 0
corresponds to an uncongested road. If all roads are congested,
we consider decreasing the length of congestion on all roads
simulatenously, at rates which keep the road latencies equal.
This continues until road p becomes completely uncongested.
This construction proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The first property follows from Lemma 5, which proves
the existence of such an equilibrium, which has overall latency
less than that of an equilibrium with selfish users only on
congested roads. The second property is from Proposition 1.
The third property follows from the fact that we do not consider
autonomous users to be selfish, and fourth properties result
from our definition of the road latency function, which increases
with congestion.
Proof of Theorem 2: computing equilibria
Proof. We denote the set of best equilibria for selfish human-
driven and autonomous flow demand λ¯h and λ¯a as BNE(λ¯h, λ¯a).
We use ˆ`p(αp) to denote the per-cell latency due to congestion,
i.e. ˆ`p(αp) =
(1−rp)n¯np(αphap+(1−αp)hhp)
rpv¯pbnp
. Lemma 4 implies that
for a given demand, all equilibria in the set BNE(λ¯h, λ¯a) have
one road that is in free-flow. We can then formulate the search
for a best equilibrium as an optimization. We are helped by
the fact that the best equilibria will use the minimum number
of feasible roads, since all users experience the same delay.
Then, for each candidate free-flow road (denote with index p′),
check feasibility of only using roads [p′], and choose a routing
that minimizes p′. The feasibility can be checked as follows,
with an optimization that utilizes Lemma 4.
arg min
f h∈Rp′≥0,f a∈Rp
′
≥0, γ∈
∏
p∈[p′−1][0,mnp]
1
s.t. γp ˆ`p(
f ap
f hp + f
a
p
) = Ip′/v¯p′ − Ip/v¯p, ∀p ∈ [p′ − 1]∑
p∈[p′]
f hp = λ¯
h
∑
p∈[p′]
f ap = λ¯
a
f hp′ + f
a
p′ ≤ F¯p′(
f ap′
f hp′ + f
a
p′
)
f hp + f
a
p = F¯p(
f ap
f hp + f
a
p
), ∀p ∈ [p′ − 1] (7)
The last constraint yields an affine relationship between f hp
and f ap for paths p ∈ [p′ − 1]. Solving for f hp and plugging
into the first constraint yields an affine relationship between
γp and f ap. This way, the optimization can be converted to a
linear program, and we must solve logP linear programs to
search the minimum feasible p′.
This formulation assumes that all vehicles are selfish. If
instead we consider selfish human drivers and fully controlled
autonomous users, we can construct a similar optimization to
find the best equilibrium. For each choice of free-flow road p′,
we minimize the total latency of the autonomous vehicles not
on free-flow roads. We then choose the routing corresponding
to free-flow road p′ that minimizes total latency (which may
not necessarily minimize the number of roads used by human
drivers). For each candidate free-flow road p′ we solve the
following optimization.
arg min
f h∈Rp′≥0,f a∈RP≥0, γ∈
∏
p∈[p′−1][0,mnp]
∑
p∈[P ]\[p′]
f ap
Ip
v¯p
s.t. γp ˆ`p(αp) = Ip′/v¯p′ − Ip/v¯p, ∀p ∈ [p′ − 1]∑
p∈[p′]
f hp = λ¯
h
∑
p∈[P ]
f ap = λ¯
a
f hp′ + f
a
p′ ≤ F¯p′(
f ap′
f hp′ + f
a
p′
)
f hp + f
a
p = F¯p(
f ap
f hp + f
a
p
), ∀p ∈ [p′ − 1]
f ap ≤ F¯ b(1), ∀p ∈ [P ]\[p′] . (8)
This can be reformulated as as linear program by the same
mechanism. Again, we solve logP linear programs and choose
the one that corresponds to the minimum feasible p′.
E. Experiment details
In implementation, we used J(k)−J(k−1) as a proxy cost
for time step k, where J(0) = 0.
As the computation infrastructure, we used 2 different
Ubuntu machines whose details are given below. For training
we used 32 CPUs in each of them.
• Ubuntu 16.04, Intel R© Xeon R© Silver 4114 CPU @
2.20GHz, 40 CPUs, 125GB RAM
• Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS, Intel R© Xeon R© CPU @ 2.20GHz, 32
CPUs, 32GB RAM
Below are the set of hyperparameters that we used for
Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). We refer to [7] for the
definitions of PPO-specific parameters. While this set yields
good results as we presented in the paper, a careful tuning
may improve the performance, especially when the number of
roads P is large.
• Number of Time Steps: 40 million
• Number of Actors: 32 (32 CPUs in parallel)
• Time Steps per Episode During Training: 300
• Time Steps per Actor Batch: 1200
•  for Clipping in the Surrogate Objective: 0.2
• Entropy Coefficient: 0.005
• Number of Optimization Epochs: 5
• Optimization Step Size: 3× 10−4
• Optimization Batch Size: 64
• γ for Advantage Estimation: 0.99
• λ for Advantage Estimation: 0.95
•  for Adam Optimization: 10−5
• Annealing for  (Clipping) and Optimization Step Size:
Linear (down to 0)
